Interesting model, but is it accounting for the internal tesegrities of the nodes (countries)?
Peter Zeihan's basic points stand - the end of a capital rich era as the Boomer generation retires, the at least temporary withdrawal of American power, and the recent recalculations of Chinese demography - a population of 1.4 billion falling by half by at least 2070 and perhaps as early as 2050. Those are huge trends.
To extend your metaphor, the cell membrane of the Chinese node in the small world tensegrity network you're conceiving here is either going to shrink or significantly deform. The same is of course true for all other nodes (countries) in the network. These deformations in the shapes of the nodes themselves impose additional tensions and compressions on the overall tensegrity network, additional tensions and compressions beyond the scope of the toy model you have presented here.
I strongly suspect that war is very likely in a model where more of the tensions and compressions are accounted for.
A fascinating model. Do you have references and cites for math to a tensegrity approach? It reminds me of the old hydraulic computers used for financial modeling back in the 1950s.
In the article I very intentionally stayed away from many discussions of internal tensegrities because this usually stirs controversies. But I actually conceived the model while considering internal pulls and pushes, just like you propose.
It works really well for evaluating the likely actions of facrions/political parties within countries, as well as corporations and even individuals.
But of course I find it easier to apply at the country level because a lot of the stochastic complexities sort of average out at that level, making analysis a bit easier.
In the Chinese case, you should follow your intuition that it's smart to evaluate the internal tensions (which are mounting almost volcanically in the next 25 years), and then compare those to the international tensions I discuss in the article.
As for the mathematics, I think that vector topographical models should work really well, but answers will vary greatly based on how the weights of tensions and compressions are assigned (which may be very subjective/difficult).
HOWEVER, such in-depth mathematical analyses are likely very important because they will probably illuminate the Fragile Points and Lever Points in the Tensegrity sculpture, meaning specific relationships or policies or demographic realities that are most likely to stress the metastability of the network.
I definitely invite people to work on actually computerizing such models, and plan to do so myself when I can find the time.
I think that the Chinese being able to make world class semiconductors would weaken their inhibitions some.
Their inability to recruit talent from across the world will make that difficult, but not impossible.
However, if the Chinese export these precious items to America or Europe, that will be another cash flow they would have to sacrifice if they decide to invade Taiwan.
Regardless, your hypothetical would indeed case a reverberation and re-ordering in the China-Taiwan Tensegrity Network for sure!
"Their inability to recruit talent from across the world" => I used to think the same, but I changed my mind after looking at international student flows. According to UNESCO, China was in 2019 the top 10th destination for international students with 200k international students per year, growing 13% YoY! (Source: http://data.uis.unesco.org/index.aspx?queryid=3804 ) On the other hand, the US attracts ~1M international students every year, and this number has been flat/declining over the past few years. (data before Covid, Unesco provides data for 2020 for China, and it's still growing +12%) Behind these numbers, I don't know who are these students studying in China. Are they the brightest ones? Maybe not, but still, this shows China can attract global talents. And attracting international students is now officially part of the Belt and Road Initiative so I'm confident China will continue to appeal to students from BRI countries (esp. Pakistan, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Malaysia, Arab countries, Africa, and Russia): https://www.universityworldnews.com/post.php?story=20210521085934537
On top of that, China has a huge internal student base. China now produces more STEM PhDs than the US (source: https://www.forbes.com/sites/michaeltnietzel/2021/08/07/us-universities-fall-behind-china-in-production-of-stem-phds/?sh=20c048014606 ) And it seems that the CCP wants to keep its students home: the number of Chinese students going to the US keeps decreasing. This is significant as "In the 2019–2020 academic year, 372,000 Chinese undergraduate and graduate students studied at U.S. universities, accounting for 35% of the total international student population.". According to Fortune: "The waning interest from Chinese students is a result of U.S. visa restrictions on Chinese students, an increase in anti-Asian racism in the U.S. amid the pandemic, and rising tensions between the U.S. and China. [...] The deteriorating circumstances for Chinese students, combined with a rising tide of nationalism in China, have made Chinese parents less motivated to send students abroad." https://fortune.com/2021/08/16/us-universities-international-students-china-covid/
So more and more international students in China and fewer and fewer Chinese students abroad. And as the CCP wants to create a world-class Chinese semiconductor industry, I'm sure they'll provide incentives to students to work in this field. According to TSMC founder, China is 5y behind them ( https://www.scmp.com/tech/big-tech/article/3130628/tsmc-founder-morris-chang-says-chinas-semiconductor-industry-still ). Can China reduce this gap with all these smart students & researchers? I think so.
"However, if the Chinese export these precious items to America or Europe, that will be another cash flow they would have to sacrifice if they decide to invade Taiwan.": China is the primary consumer of semiconductors, so I guess they will first use their own semiconductors (probably of lower quality initially) in their own products, maybe for their domestic market first, before exporting them. This would align quite well with Xi's "Dual circulation" strategy. In that case, they would not sacrifice any cash flow. Unless America and Europe refuse to buy any item made in China after an invasion? By the way, "Europe" is not unified against China. Italy and Greece have joined the Belt and Road Initiative for instance. (although this may change): https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/u-s-struggles-unite-democratic-european-allies-against-china-n1275773
To sum up my view: I think China can invade Taiwan if and only if they become self-sufficient in semi-conductors (this doesn't necessarily mean that Chinese semi-conductors are as good or better as Taiwanese ones. And I think they can do so by 2035.
Interesting model, but is it accounting for the internal tesegrities of the nodes (countries)?
Peter Zeihan's basic points stand - the end of a capital rich era as the Boomer generation retires, the at least temporary withdrawal of American power, and the recent recalculations of Chinese demography - a population of 1.4 billion falling by half by at least 2070 and perhaps as early as 2050. Those are huge trends.
To extend your metaphor, the cell membrane of the Chinese node in the small world tensegrity network you're conceiving here is either going to shrink or significantly deform. The same is of course true for all other nodes (countries) in the network. These deformations in the shapes of the nodes themselves impose additional tensions and compressions on the overall tensegrity network, additional tensions and compressions beyond the scope of the toy model you have presented here.
I strongly suspect that war is very likely in a model where more of the tensions and compressions are accounted for.
A fascinating model. Do you have references and cites for math to a tensegrity approach? It reminds me of the old hydraulic computers used for financial modeling back in the 1950s.
Great points, thank you.
In the article I very intentionally stayed away from many discussions of internal tensegrities because this usually stirs controversies. But I actually conceived the model while considering internal pulls and pushes, just like you propose.
It works really well for evaluating the likely actions of facrions/political parties within countries, as well as corporations and even individuals.
But of course I find it easier to apply at the country level because a lot of the stochastic complexities sort of average out at that level, making analysis a bit easier.
In the Chinese case, you should follow your intuition that it's smart to evaluate the internal tensions (which are mounting almost volcanically in the next 25 years), and then compare those to the international tensions I discuss in the article.
As for the mathematics, I think that vector topographical models should work really well, but answers will vary greatly based on how the weights of tensions and compressions are assigned (which may be very subjective/difficult).
HOWEVER, such in-depth mathematical analyses are likely very important because they will probably illuminate the Fragile Points and Lever Points in the Tensegrity sculpture, meaning specific relationships or policies or demographic realities that are most likely to stress the metastability of the network.
I definitely invite people to work on actually computerizing such models, and plan to do so myself when I can find the time.
This has been a goal of mine for a decade or so.
Thanks for this great article!
I agree that the dependence of China on Taiwan for semiconductors prevents a war.
But what if by 2035, Chinese companies reach the same technical level as TSMC?
They've already progressed a lot over the past few years: https://www.brookings.edu/techstream/lagging-but-motivated-the-state-of-chinas-semiconductor-industry/
Could they catch the US by surprise the same way they recently did with hypersonic missiles? ""The test showed that China had made astounding progress on hypersonic weapons and was far more advanced than US officials realised," the report said, citing people briefed on the intelligence." https://www.reuters.com/world/china-surprises-us-with-hypersonic-missile-test-ft-reports-2021-10-17/
Great questions!
I think that the Chinese being able to make world class semiconductors would weaken their inhibitions some.
Their inability to recruit talent from across the world will make that difficult, but not impossible.
However, if the Chinese export these precious items to America or Europe, that will be another cash flow they would have to sacrifice if they decide to invade Taiwan.
Regardless, your hypothetical would indeed case a reverberation and re-ordering in the China-Taiwan Tensegrity Network for sure!
*cause a reverberation.
Thanks for taking the time to answer!
"Their inability to recruit talent from across the world" => I used to think the same, but I changed my mind after looking at international student flows. According to UNESCO, China was in 2019 the top 10th destination for international students with 200k international students per year, growing 13% YoY! (Source: http://data.uis.unesco.org/index.aspx?queryid=3804 ) On the other hand, the US attracts ~1M international students every year, and this number has been flat/declining over the past few years. (data before Covid, Unesco provides data for 2020 for China, and it's still growing +12%) Behind these numbers, I don't know who are these students studying in China. Are they the brightest ones? Maybe not, but still, this shows China can attract global talents. And attracting international students is now officially part of the Belt and Road Initiative so I'm confident China will continue to appeal to students from BRI countries (esp. Pakistan, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Malaysia, Arab countries, Africa, and Russia): https://www.universityworldnews.com/post.php?story=20210521085934537
On top of that, China has a huge internal student base. China now produces more STEM PhDs than the US (source: https://www.forbes.com/sites/michaeltnietzel/2021/08/07/us-universities-fall-behind-china-in-production-of-stem-phds/?sh=20c048014606 ) And it seems that the CCP wants to keep its students home: the number of Chinese students going to the US keeps decreasing. This is significant as "In the 2019–2020 academic year, 372,000 Chinese undergraduate and graduate students studied at U.S. universities, accounting for 35% of the total international student population.". According to Fortune: "The waning interest from Chinese students is a result of U.S. visa restrictions on Chinese students, an increase in anti-Asian racism in the U.S. amid the pandemic, and rising tensions between the U.S. and China. [...] The deteriorating circumstances for Chinese students, combined with a rising tide of nationalism in China, have made Chinese parents less motivated to send students abroad." https://fortune.com/2021/08/16/us-universities-international-students-china-covid/
So more and more international students in China and fewer and fewer Chinese students abroad. And as the CCP wants to create a world-class Chinese semiconductor industry, I'm sure they'll provide incentives to students to work in this field. According to TSMC founder, China is 5y behind them ( https://www.scmp.com/tech/big-tech/article/3130628/tsmc-founder-morris-chang-says-chinas-semiconductor-industry-still ). Can China reduce this gap with all these smart students & researchers? I think so.
"However, if the Chinese export these precious items to America or Europe, that will be another cash flow they would have to sacrifice if they decide to invade Taiwan.": China is the primary consumer of semiconductors, so I guess they will first use their own semiconductors (probably of lower quality initially) in their own products, maybe for their domestic market first, before exporting them. This would align quite well with Xi's "Dual circulation" strategy. In that case, they would not sacrifice any cash flow. Unless America and Europe refuse to buy any item made in China after an invasion? By the way, "Europe" is not unified against China. Italy and Greece have joined the Belt and Road Initiative for instance. (although this may change): https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/u-s-struggles-unite-democratic-european-allies-against-china-n1275773
To sum up my view: I think China can invade Taiwan if and only if they become self-sufficient in semi-conductors (this doesn't necessarily mean that Chinese semi-conductors are as good or better as Taiwanese ones. And I think they can do so by 2035.
What do you think?
I didn't know that. Thank you for the informative links!
Have to update the Simulation In My Head....